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I. INTRODUCTION
Under assault from overseas, plants in the United States are clos-
ing and unions in the United States have lost the ability to protect
their members' jobs. The prospect of still stiffer competition from
a more integrated European economy promises more of the same.'
* B.A., Harvard College; MA, Ph.D., Columbia University; JD, University of Chicago Law
School. Senior Attorney at Northeast Ohio Legal Services, Youngstown, Ohio.
•* B.A., Roosevelt College; JD, University of Pittsburgh Law School. Senior Attorney at North-
east Ohio Legal Services, Youngstown, Ohio.
1. In referring to an "assault from overseas" and "the prospect of still stiffer competition
from Europe," the authors are not placing blame on European workers. Overall, labor costs in Europe
including the cost of legally required insurance programs and various benefit plans are higher than
labor costs in the United States. In 1989, compensation of European production workers averaged
102 percent of United States costs. Hourly compensation costs were between 20 and 30 percent higher
in Germany, Norway, and Sweden, and 5 to 15 percent higher in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland. Bureau of Labor Statistics report 787, summarized in Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs, 134 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 188-89 (1990). If European firms are more efficient than
their counterparts in the United States, this would appear to be due to acceptance of lower profit
margins, greater insistence on quality, the diversion of fewer resources to military efforts, and such
factors, not to lower labor costs in Europe.
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This crisis has been with us since the 1970s. Its dimensions are
familiar. 2 Real wages have fallen. The percentage of non-farm work-
ers in trade unions is about half what it was in the 1950s. Unions
win a declining proportion of NLRB elections. Board and court
decisions have narrowed the space within which workers can carry
on self-organized concerted activity on the shop floor. Concession
bargaining has become a way of life.
Commonplace as these perceptions have become, it may still not
be recognized how fundamentally the promise of CIO unionism has
miscarried. Unions like the United Steelworkers of America and the
United Auto Workers are centralized one-party governments. Work-
ers have tolerated these institutions because such unions, so it ap-
peared, could establish uniform employment conditions throughout
the national economy. Above all, workers felt the unions could de-
liver a trouble-free retirement by means of collectively-bargained
pension and medical insurance programs.
After World War II, management and organized labor in the
United States undertook to provide, through private collective bar-
gaining, "fringe benefits" which in other industrialized nations are
financed by taxes and provided by the state.3 Entire communities
like Youngstown, Ohio came to be composed of families whose
members worked their entire lives in one plant so as to become
entitled to the fringe benefits that such long service made possible.
The pattern of culture was that wages went to buy homes which
pensions would make it possible to live in happily, free of anxiety
because of medical insurance. Workers took less in wages because
of the promise of benefits when they retired. They viewed pensions
and medical insurance as deferred compensation, for which consid-
eration in the form of their labor had been fully rendered at the
time of retirement.
2. See, e.g., Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization under
the NLRA, 96 HtAv. L. Ray., 1769-1827 (1983); Chaison & Dhavale, A Note on the Severity of the
Decline in Union Organizing Activity, 43 IN'Dus. & LAB. REL. REV., 366-73 (1990).
3. Voluntary employment-based private plans are the primary source of health insurance cov-
erage for most of the U.S. population, while publicly financed compulsory schemes are primary in
every other major industrialized nation, according to a study conducted by the Employee Benefit
Research Institute and reported in Commerce Clearing House, Employee Benefits Management Di-
rections, (CCH), No. 12, at 3 (October 16, 1990).
[Vol. 93
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This is the bargain that has collapsed in the era of multina-
tionalism. National labor unions have shown themselves impotent
to protect their members against imports or the flight of capital.
Under pressure from overseas competition, the practice of collec-
tively bargaining fringe benefits has broken down. There is a fringe
benefits crisis within, and as a result of, a crisis of plant closings
and loss of jobs.
The outline of the crisis is that corporations made promises to
unions with respect to both pensions and medical benefits which
they cannot fulfill. A shrinking workforce in industries such as steel
cannot generate the cash flow needed to pay for the benefits of a
much larger number of retirees.4
The steel industry - both basic steel and steel fabricating - is
especially instructive as an example of the effects of foreign com-
petition. The American steel industry has faced a growing global
market for thirty years and lost a quarter of its domestic market
to foreign imports. Accordingly, the effects of foreign competition
are prevalent in the steel industry. We can expect the effects cur-
rently seen in the steel industry to be repeated in other American
industries as they face increasing levels of foreign competition.5
4. There is a vast literature on the crisis in employer-financed medical insurance programs.
See, e.g., UNsrrE STATES GmE.L Accoumrna OFFICE, EMPLOYEE BEEN=s: ExTENT OF CoMANIas'
RETmE HEALTH CovERAGE, HRD-90-92 (March 1990); U.S. BsTLAN COMIMSSION ON COMPRE-
HENSIVE HEATH CARE (the Pepper Commission), 101st CONG., Ist Sass., A CALL FOR ACTION at 25-
30 (Sept. 1990); Karp, Retirees Fight Health Benefit Cutbacks by Employers, A.B.A. COam'N ON
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY, 11 BirocAL No. 2 (Summer 1990). As a result many private cor-
porations now support some form of government health insurance. Uchitelle, Seeking U.S. Aid for
Health Care, The New York Times, May 21, 1990, at D2. The crisis in employer-financed pension
plans is especially evident in the steel industry, because of the high ratio of retirees to active workers
as a result of mill closings. See section III, infra.
5. The long-term dilemmas of the steel industry are discussed in FEDERAL TRADE COmmssoN,
THE UNrTED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY AND ITS INTERNATIONAL CoMParnoRs: TRENDs AND FACTORS
DETERmInmNG INTERNATIONAL CompETvENEss (1977); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOY ASSESSMENT, TECH-
NOLOGY AND STEEL INDUsTRY COMPETIvi Ess (1980); and R. CRA , THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY
ni RECURRENT CIsis (1981). The decline of a particular steel mill is narrated in M. REuTER, SPARRows
PoDIT: MAKING STEEL-THE RISE AND RuiN OF AMEuCAN INDusTRIAL NoT (1988), and of particular
steelmaking communities in D. BENSMAN & R. LYNCH, RUsTED DREAMS: HARD TnmS IN A STEEL
ComsuNiry (1987), and S. LYND, Tan FiaHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS: YOUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL CLOS-
INGs, 1977-1980 (1982).
Other industries exhibit similar symptoms in varying degrees. The UAW estimated that to add
a cost of living feature to pensions would cost "about $6.00 hourly per worker, or more than all of
19911
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In a recent response to the crisis in employer-financed pension
programs, the Supreme Court of the United States has summoned
workers to "object strenuously" and to "resist" when corporations
seek to curtail fringe benefit commitments. The problem was pre-
sented to the court in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. L TV
Corporation, decided on June 18, 1990.6 There the Court upheld a
decision of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to
restore to LTV Steel Company, Inc. (LTV) three previously-ter-
minated pension plans. PBGC said that the plans should be restored
because LTV had abused the pension guaranty program by nego-
tiating what it called "follow-on plans," that is, "pension arrange-
ments intended to make up benefits that plan participants lost as
a result of the [pension plans'] termination." '7
The Supreme Court found that PBGC's policy against follow-
on plans was a permissible construction of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA). PBGC convinced the Court that its
policy encourages workers to fight harder for their fringe benefits.
In oral argument before the Court, Attorney Carol Flowe of the
PBGC described the agency rationale as follows:
If an employee stands to lose when his plan terminates, then he's going to resist
termination, and he's also going to pressure his employer to fund the plan better
in the first instance.'
The Supreme Court agreed. In the words of its decision:
the UAW's other demands combined." 134 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 4, at 114 (1990). The cost of
medical insurance is also staggering, especially at Chrysler, where hourly labor costs are more than
$2.00 per hour higher than those at GM and Ford because Chrysler has "as many retirees as active
workers." Chrysler's health bills amount to more than $700 million a year and are increasing 12-20
percent annually. 134 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 11, at 339-40 (1990). According to Chrysler vice chairman
Robert Miller, Chrysler pays $700 in health-care costs for each vehicle manufactured, as compared
to $375 per vehicle in France, $337 in Germany, $246 in Japan, and $223 in Canada. 135 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 124 (1990).
6. 87 Bankr. 779 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110
S. Ct. 2668 (1990).
7. 110 S. Ct. 2668, 2673.
8. Transcript at 12, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corporation, 110 S. Ct.
2668 (1990) (No. 89-390). In the view of the PBGC, Attorney Flowe explained to the Court, a policy
prohibiting follow-up plans provides "disincentives to [pension plan] termination from the standpoint
of employees and their unions ... ." Transcript at 13, id. Thus, "if the union doesn't think it can
have follow-on plans, once the company tries to negotiate to get permission to terminate ... the
union will say no." Transcript at 56, id.
[Vol. 93
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The PBGC's anti-follow-on policy is premised on the belief, which we find em-
inently reasonable, that employees will object more strenuously to a company's
original decision to terminate a plan (or to take financial steps that make ter-
mination likely) if the company cannot use a follow-on plan to put the employees
in the same (or a similar) position after termination as they were in before. The
availability of a follow-on plan thus would remove a significant check - employee
resistance - against termination of a pension plan. 9
For the past four years, the authors have represented Youngs-
town-area retirees who have "object[ed] ... strenuously" and vig-
orously "resist[ed]" changes in promised medical and pension
benefits. They have carried on this struggle through a retiree or-
ganization named Solidarity USA. We think it will be instructive to
tell the story of the benefits crisis in this part of the country from
the standpoint of the workers who have resisted it. We hope to show:
(1) that there is indeed a fringe benefit crisis; (2) that patchwork
national legislation has dramatically failed; (3) that retirees, who (at
least in the case of steel) no longer belong to the union, do not pay
dues, do not vote to elect union officers, do not vote on changes
in retiree benefits negotiated by the union, and, as a result, have
no control over what the union does, cannot rely on the union to
protect their benefits; 10 (4) that what is emerging is, on the one hand,
9. 110 S. Ct. 2668, 2670 (emphasis added).
10. A union that seeks to bargain for both current workers and retirees may be compared to
the union of white railroad workers in Steel v. Louisville & Nashville, 323 U.S. 192 (1944). There,
a union wholly made up of white workers also bargained for black workers who were not allowed
in the union and could not vote on contracts. Inevitably, the union tended to favor its dues-paying
members.
Retirees believe that unions that bargain for both current workers and retirees favor the interests
of current workers, for the same reason. Thus, the contract negotiated between the United Steelworkers
of America (hereafter USWA) and LTV in 1990 provided $7.00 in contract improvements for the
average current worker as compared to $1.00 in contract improvements for the average retiree. A
Solidarity USA pamphlet detailed the following contrasts in benefits received by current workers and
retirees:
Benefit Current Workers Will Get Retirees Will Get
Life Insurance $17,500 $3,500 - $5,000
Hospice benefits Unlimited coverage Nothing
Diagnostic X-ray Annual maximum increases Annual maximum
ultra sound devices from $400 to $1,500 remains at $75
Major medical Annual maximum increases Annual maximum
annual maximum from $30,000 to $50,000 remains at $30,000
Major medical Increases from $50,000 Remains $50,000 but
1991]
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a greater government role (as in national health insurance)," and
on the other hand, a rebuilding of the labor movement from below
by grassroots direct action.
II. MEDICAL BENEFITS
A. Medical Benefits I LTV
On July .17, 1986, LTV filed for Chapter 11 protection in the
Bankruptcy Court of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.12
LTV is an amalgam of what used to be Jones & Laughlin Steel,
the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Corporation, and Republic Steel.
It is the second-largest steel company in the nation, after USX (for-
merly U.S. Steel).
At the same time that it filed its bankruptcy petition, LTV, a
self-insured employer, directed the insurance companies that ad-
lifetime maximum to $250,000 new entitlement to
that amount begins
in 1991
Dental benefits Lifetime maximum Not provided
increases from $650
to $1,300
Vision care Program in effect Not provided
benefits before May 1, 1986
is reinstated
Employer payment Employer pays 100 Employer will pay 50
of major medical percent percent beginning in 1991
premiums
Ratification bonus $1,000 Nothing
Right to ratify Yes No
Leaflet from Solidarity USA Inc., You Be the Judge (Mar. 1990) (available upon request from authors).
11. The national health insurance proposal most familiar to Mahoning Valley retirees is the
Canadian health insurance system as modified by the Cambridge-based Physicians for a National
Health Program. Himmelstein, A National Health Program for the United States, 320 NEw ENo. J.
oF MED. 102 (1989); National Council of Senior Citizens, Paying More, Getting Less: How U.S.
Health Care Measures Up (1990). The latter publication compares health care in Canada, Sweden,
Great Britain, Japan, West Germany, and the United States, concluding: "Of the six nations com-
pared, only one does not have a national health care system. Only one does not guarantee universal
access. Only one spends more than 10 percent of the G.N.P. on health care. Only one requires patients
to pay 29 percent of total health care costs out-of-pocket. This is the United States." Id. at 1.
12. In re Chateaugay Corporation, Reomar, Inc., the LTV Corporation, 112 Bankr. 526 (Bankr.
S.D. N.Y. 1990). 6
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ministered its benefits programs to stop paying medical and life in-
surance claims to approximately 80,000 hourly and salaried retirees,
11,000 of them in the Youngstown area, as well as to 20-25,000
current workers. The legal rationale for the action was that these
claims arose pursuant to collective bargaining agreements in effect
at the time of the bankruptcy filing, hence were pre-petition debts.
The results were catastrophic. 13 Roy St. Clair, a retiree who lived
in a steelworkers' suburb south of Youngstown named Struthers,
came home from the hospital the day the company filed for bank-
ruptcy. St. Clair had a heart condition. After a day spent frantically
seeking for alternative medical insurance, he experienced a recur-
rence of his heart symptoms, but did not seek hospitalization because
he did not know how he could pay the bill. He died a few hours
later. Early in 1987 another Struthers resident, Louis Lipka, blew
his brains out in his bedroom because (according to his wife) he
was worried about the family's benefits.
Community response was strong. 14 Clergymen and Congressmen
spoke of "industrial terrorism," of conduct no different from "a
mugging," of "one of the most unconscionable corporate acts in
this century." The pro-business Youngstown Vindicator editorial-
ized: "We think the whole situation stinks.' ' 5
Resistance sprang up on several fronts. Workers at LTV's steel
mill in East Chicago, Indiana, walked off the job after the wives
of retirees set up a picket line outside the mill. Senator Metzenbaum
conducted committee hearings in Cleveland at which retirees testi-
fied. In Youngstown, Delores Hrycyk, a lector at a Catholic Church
and wife of a retiree with thirty-six years at Republic Steel, tele-
13. The authors took part in the events described in the remainder of this article. For example,
the events leading up to the death of Roy St. Clair were narrated to them by Rev. Rob Dietrich,
Mr. St. Clair's minister, and they interviewed Mrs. Louis Lipka after her husband's suicide. Statements
in the text for which no source is cited are based on the personal experience of the authors and on
material in their possession.
14. Letter from William J. Witt to the editor, Youngstown Vindicator, Aug. 10, 1986.
15. Youngstown Vindicator, editorial, July 23, 1986; see also, Congressional Delegation In-
vestigates LTV Action, Stripscript, Local 2265, USWA, Aug. 1986, at 1. The other Mahoning Valley
newspaper quoted Sen. Howard Metzenbaum's characterization of the company action as "a travesty
of fairness" and "an act of extraordinary insensitivity," adding: "We agree." Warren Tribune Chron-
icle, July 28, 1986, at A4.
1991]
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phoned radio talk shows and called a rally in downtown Youngstown
for Saturday, July 26. A thousand people attended. Less than a
month after it stopped paying benefits, LTV asked the Bankruptcy
Court for permission to resume payments.
Meantime, Youngstown-area retirees, under Hyrcyk's leadership,
formed an organization with the name Solidarity USA. The idea
was an organization in this country similar to the Polish union,
Solidarity. Donations poured in from unions, city councils, physi-
cians, and others. Between August 1986 and March 1987 the group
took busloads of retirees to the Bankruptcy Court in New York
City, to Washington, D.C., to sympathetic city councils in Pitts-
burgh and Cleveland, and to Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, where on
several occasions retirees sat down in the street leading to the mill
gate.
On January 31, 1987, more than two thousand retirees from LTV
plants in northeastern Ohio and western Pennsylvania, met in
Youngstown's largest auditorium to plan further mass action. The
gathering was addressed by Bishop James Malone, bishop of the
Youngstown diocese and recently-retired president of the National
Council of Catholic Bishops, Senator Metzenbaum, Congressman
James Traficant and others. On April 12, 1987, retirees gathered at
St. Titus Catholic Church in Aliquippa to celebrate Palm Sunday.
It was the fiftieth anniversary of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel,16 holding the Wagner Act constitutional. As the Wall Street
Journal described the scene:
On Palm Sunday, hundreds of LTV Corp. pensioners reunited outside the
steelmaker's nearly deserted mill here to play out a symbolic crucifixion - their
own. Anchoring a makeshift pine cross outside the plant gates, the gray-haired
throng chanted, "Who owns the pensions? The workers!"' 7
We were among those who walked from the church to the mill
gate, carrying palms. The gate had been the scene of daily dem-
onstrations by retirees seeking guarantees for their pension and med-
16. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
17. Wall Street Journal, May 27, 1987, at 1.
[Vol. 93
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ical benefits. At the gate, a former tractor operator explained in
broken English that he had been discharged by the company in the
mid-1930s, and was one of those who filed the NLRB charge that
became the Jones & Laughlin case. We also heard from Monsignor
Charles Owen Rice, Pittsburgh's celebrated labor priest, from De-
lores Hrycyk, and from an acoustic band and chorus who sang
"Christ the Worker." As the mass ended, bread was distributed,
Easter embraces exchanged, and the hat passed to collect funds for
the next demonstration.
A second generation of Solidarity USA leaders was elected in
1988. They included Jerry Morrison, a Teamsters organizer, and Ed
Mann, formerly president of Local 1462, USWA. A newsletter was
begun. The group meets once a month at the Odd Fellows hall in
Hubbard, Ohio, northeast of Youngstown. 18
The retirees who make up Solidarity USA have up to forty-odd
years' seniority in Mahoning Valley steel mills. They pride them-
selves on keeping their contractual promises. Even in the 116-day
strike of 1959, they found ways, with the help of extended family
members, to make their mortgage payments and maintain their credit
ratings. Now, they say, it is the companies' turn to carry out con-
tracts. Their slogan, chanted in innumerable Solidarity USA dem-
onstrations, is: "We worked for it, we earned it, we want every
penny of it."
The retirees have a complex relationship with the United Steel-
workers of America. These men and women, now in their fifties,
sixties, and seventies, built the CIO in the Mahoning Valley. Many
were local union officers and grievance committeemen. "Don't get
me wrong," they will say. "I'm not anti-union. We are the union!"
But these retirees are bitterly disappointed in the union's rep-
resentation, or lack thereof. In the United Steelworkers of America,
retirees are no longer members of the union, hence they do not pay
18. The International Order of Odd Fellows (IOOF) is understood by Mahoning Valley residents
to have been founded by poor people who were not welcome in more prestigious fraternal groups.
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dues, cannot vote for union officers, and have no voice in the ne-
gotiation or ratification of contracts that affect their benefits. Yet
the union insists on representing them, for example in the LTV
bankruptcy proceedings. 19
Thus in August 1987, thirteen months after LTV sought Chapter
11 protection, the Steelworkers negotiated a contract that required
retirees to pay $26.82 a month for basic hospitalization insurance
that had hitherto been fully paid by the company. 20 These retirees
had given up wages when they were working so that they would not
have to pay for these benefits after they retired, and now they were
being asked to pay for them again. Youngstown retirees still speak
of how they learned about this imposition at a meeting called by
the Steelworkers in a Youngstown auditorium, at which active work-
ers (who could vote on the contract) were seated in front, and re-
tirees (who could not vote) were seated behind a rope at the rear.
Not surprisingly, as the 1990 negotiations approached, the retirees'
leading demands were to have a role in negotiations and a vote on
the resulting contract.
Problems with medical insurance affect all LTV retirees. These
problems have been of several kinds:
1. After LTV stopped payment of medical benefits in July 1986,
Congress passed a resolution that forbade LTV or any other com-
pany in Chapter 11 proceedings from unilaterally ceasing to pay
medical insurance claims to retirees. This resolution was extended
a number of times, until, in 1988, Congress passed the Retiree Ben-
19. The 1988 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code permit a union to choose whether or not
it will represent retirees in bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(c)(1) (1989). The UAW has
typically chosen not to represent hourly retirees in bankruptcy cases. So did the United Rubber Workers
in the Republic Hose case discussed in the text. In all the other cases discussed herein, the USWA
chose to represent retirees.
20. Prior to August 1987, basic hospitalization insurance (which also includes some physicians'
services) was financed by LTV, while retirees paid the entire cost of "optional major medical" in-
surance through deductions from their pension checks. The 1987 collective bargaining agreement con-
tinued unchanged the arrangements for major medical insurance, apart from the increases in premiums
discussed in the text, infra. The new $26.82 a month payment for basic hospitalization insurance was
deducted from retirees' pension checks. A comparable sum was deducted from current employees'
profit-sharing accounts but it was not deducted from their pay. After any year during which LTV
Steel made $200 million or more in profits the $26.82 a month payments for the previous year were
to be returned, without interest.
[Vol. 93
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efits Bankruptcy Protection Act which added Section 1114 to the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 111 4(e)(1) directed a Chapter 11 debtor-
in-possession to "timely pay and ... not modify" 21 retiree medical
and life insurance benefits, unless and until a modification was ne-
gotiated with the union (in the case of hourly retirees) or ordered
by the Court. The Steelworkers union, the Auto Workers union,
and Solidarity USA, all lobbied for Section 1114 and contributed
to its drafting and legislative history.
2. The $26.82 a month premium for hospitalization coverage that
the union agreed to in 1987 was a constant irritation. In the fall of
1988, LTV announced that it had not earned $200 million that year,
and so would not return the monthly premiums. Solidarity USA and
a sister organization, Retirees Against Greed and Exploitation
(RAGE) of Canton, Ohio, chartered buses to Cleveland and picketed
LTV headquarters. Soon thereafter, the company announced it would
return the premiums after all. In the 1990 negotiations the $26.82
was finally abolished.
3. In response to increasing health care costs, insurance admin-
istrators delayed payments and chiseled away claims. The company
and union (without consulting retirees) agreed to substitute Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Ohio ("Blue Cross") for the Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company ("Metropolitan") as administrator of LTV's ma-
jor medical program, effective January 1989. Blue Cross thereby
became administrator of both hospitalization and major medical in-
surance for hourly retirees. Solidarity USA members soon found
that Blue Cross was shifting procedures performed at a hospital
(such as a treadmill test for a heart condition) from hospitalization
coverage that paid participants 100 percent of cost, to major medical
coverage that paid only 80 percent.2
Enraged retirees demanded interviews with decisionmakers at the
headquarters of Blue Cross and LTV in Cleveland and with the
union in Pittsburgh. A pattern repeated itself three times. Solidarity
21. 11 U.S.C. § l114(e)(1).
22. The shift of payment from basic to major medical policies also reduced costs charged to
LTV and tended to raise premium costs for retirees, as well as causing many retirees to fear that
their claims would come to exceed the $50,000 lifetime maximum for major medical.
1991]
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USA would write that it was coming to Cleveland or Pittsburgh for
a meeting on a certain day. Each organization replied that it would
not meet with Solidarity USA representatives. Solidarity USA replied
that it was coming anyway, with chartered buses, picket signs, and
bullhorns, and lo!, in each case the meeting was had. The upshot
was weekly visits of Solidarity USA members with unpaid medical
claims to the Youngstown office of LTV, where a working rela-
tionship was hammered out, and a decision by the union to go back
to Metropolitan as major medical insurance administrator.
4. Early in 1990, Solidarity USA presented evidence to the Bank-
ruptcy Court in Manhattan that many early retirees from LTV had
lost as much as 15-20 percent of their pension income since the
company filed for bankruptcy, above all because of runaway in-
creases in major medical premiums. 3 The figures, uncontested by
counsel for LTV or by Judge Lifland, were as follows:
Loss of part of pension supplement, taxation of pension sup-
plement. Approximately 8,000 retirees who were forced to retire early
when their plants shut down were promised $400.00 per month pen-
sion supplement until age 62 (early Social Security retirement age).
They have lost:
Pension supplement reduced from $400/mo. to
$360/mo. $40.00/mo.
FICA tax on supplement because supplement no
longer paid from a qualified pension plan 27.04/mo.
Loss due to pension plan termination $67.04/mo.
Increased medical premiums. The basic hospital insurance in effect
when LTV filed for bankruptcy was free of charge, apart from de-
23. Bobby G. Burns and eleven other individual LTV retirees or spouses and Retirees Against
Greed and Exploitation (RAGE), Senior Citizens Committee of Local 1375 USWA, Solidarity USA,
Solidarity USA - Aliquippa, and Tunnel Rats for Workers Solidarity, Objections to "Notice of
Motion for Order Approving and Authorizing Debtors to Implement a Key Employee Extension Plan,"
Jan. 5, 1990, at 5-6. For certain LTV retirees in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, who had chosen coverage
with a Health Maintenance Organization as an alternative to major medical coverage through an
insurance company, the proposed premium increases were even greater: from $34.78 a month in 1989
to $133.34 in 1990 for a retiree and spouse, both Medicare-eligible. Letter from George Glomb on
behalf of LTV Retirees Solidarity USA, Aliquippa Chapter, to D. J. Evans, Director Employee Ben-
efits, LTV Steel Company, Jan. 18, 1990.
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ductibles, expenses not covered, etc. It was increased to $26.82 per
month after August 1987, although these premiums were returned
(without interest) in years when LTV made a $200 million profit.
Major medical premiums have increased as follows:




Basic hospital - $26.82/mo. $26.82/mo.
Major medical $26.89/mo. $43.30/mo. $70.66/mo.




Basic hospital - $ 26.82/mo. $ 26.82/mo.
Major medical $52.66/mo. $ 86.66/mo. $141.32/mo.
Total per month $52.66/mo. $113.48/mo. $168.14/mo.
Once again Solidarity USA's pressure bore fruit. Although the
court refused to require the union to submit its 1990 contract with
LTV to retirees for a vote, when that contract was made public it
provided, first, for cancellation of a previously-announced increase
of up to 63 percent in major medical premiums for 1990, and sec-
ond, for the payment of one-half the major medical premium by
LTV beginning in January 1991. 24
Each of the victories described required an intense, abrasive
struggle not only with LTV but with the Steelworkers union. In its
publication for retirees, the USWA International Executive Board
described Solidarity USA (without naming it) as a "rump" made
up of "dissidents," and called on retirees to be uncritically sup-
portive of the Union "before, during and after contract negotia-
24. The cost of major medical insurance remains a problem for other groups of retirees. In
the fall of 1990, retirees of Copperweld Steel in Warren, Ohio were informed that the major medical
premium for an individual not yet 65 and therefore not covered by Medicare would increase from
$80 to $125 a month (56 percent), while for individuals 65 and over the increase would be from
$49.25 to $72 a month (46 percent). Premiums for Copperweld retirees have increased ten-fold since
the program was begun in the early 1980s.
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tions." The charge was especially incongruous because in PBGC
v. LTV Corp., Solidarity USA supported PBGC's effort to restore
the pension plans at issue to LTV, while the USWA, after initially
equivocating, opposed PBGC and supported LTV in the courts. 26
Members of Solidarity USA and kindred retiree groups are re-
luctant to spend their golden years in unremitting conflict with both
company and union to preserve or restore promised benefits. In the
spring of 1989, Solidarity USA endorsed national health insurance
based on the Canadian model. The process was as follows. A retiree
group in Aliquippa proposed the creation of a Health Benefits Guar-
anty Corporation, similar to the PBGC. Solidarity USA was sym-
pathetic but troubled. The Aliquippa project, if successful, would
provide medical insurance only to those who had already won it
through collective bargaining. Thirty to forty million Americans who
had never had medical insurance would not be helped. 27
25. In January 1990, the Executive Board adopted a resolution stating on behalf of the Union
and its official retiree organization, SOAR:
Whereas, SOAR's ability to serve our retired members in an appropriate way during ne-
gotiations is today threatened by the disruptive tactics of certain rump groups that claim
to represent retirees. The goal of SOAR is to re-identify USWA retirees with the Inter-
national Union. The actions of such dissident groups result in alienating retirees from the
International Union, and
Whereas, our union's traditional and historic function in any contract negotiations would
be seriously jeopardized if, to any degree, officially or semi-officially, we permit the bar-
gaining agenda for retirees to be formulated or influenced by such dissidents, and,
Whereas, negotiations with the LTV Corporation this year are going to be extremely difficult
because this company is still operating under Chapter Eleven Bankruptcy, therefore the
interests of active members and retirees will best be served only if all retirees are solidly
supportive before, during and after contract negotiations, as pledged by SOAR, and,
Whereas, the concern of SOAR in this matter extends not only to the handful of current
dissidents bent on exploiting the sensitive 1990 LTV contract talks, but also extends to the
fact that such disruptive tactics can and most assuredly will be used by companies and anti-
union groups that would profit from failed negotiations. Using the same tactics, a company
financed group, purportedly defending the interests of active USWA members and/or re-
tirees, could sow discord and seriously weaken our union.
3 Soar Insider, No. I at 2 (Mar. 1990) (emphasis in original).
26. Solidarity USA filed an amicus brief supporting PBGC in the District Court. USWA General
Counsel Bernard Kleiman told LTV workers and retirees at Stambaugh Auditorium in Youngstown
on July 15, 1987 that if PBGC decided to return the pension plans to LTV it would be okay with
the Union. Notes of Alice Lynd, July 15, 1987. When PBGC announced that very decision a month
later, the USWA opposed it in the District Court and on appeal.
27. A General Accounting Office study gives the number of uninsured Americans in 1986 as
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In the end, Solidarity USA rousingly endorsed what the authors
were careful to describe as "national health insurance," but what
Solidarity USA members routinely, and matter-of-factly, referred to
as socialized medicine.
B. Medical Benefits 11 Tee Nee Trailer
Workers, for small as well as large companies, have found that
the medical benefits they counted on were not there when it came
time to collect.
In October 1989, August Vespasian, local union president at the
Tee Nee Trailer Company, received explanations of benefits from
Blue Cross that said, "Since these services were rendered after the
cancellation of this group's coverage, we are unable to provide ben-
efits for these charges." A few days later the president of the com-
pany sent a notice to all employees saying that their Blue Cross
coverage had been cancelled because the company did not have the
money to pay premiums. The notice advised workers to get their
own insurance.
Still later, Tee Nee Trailer workers learned that the insurance
had been cancelled retroactive to June 1, 1989, and that it was too
late to convert to individual coverage. The Vespasians owed thou-
sands of dollars in medical bills. During the summer of 1989, the
company president had advised Mr. Vespasian to get surgery that
he needed. Mrs. Vespasian had cancer which required ongoing treat-
ment, as well as other serious conditions.
An amendment to ERISA known as COBRA28 was intended to
provide continuing coverage at the participant's expense, but at group
rates, and without exclusion of pre-existing conditions or a waiting
period. But there was no possibility of COBRA coverage at Tee Nee
Trailer because the employer was no longer offering group health
insurance to any of its employees, and there was no on-going plan
36.8 million. Health Insurance: An Overview of the Working Uninsured, GAO/HRD-89-45 at 11
(Feb. 1989).
28. ERISA §§ 601-08, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (1988).
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to which Tee Nee Trailer workers could be added. The Vespasians
were in their late fifties with years to go before they would be eligible
for Medicare at age 65. No alternative coverage, even if they could
afford it, would be comparable to the coverage they lost, which had
totally covered generic prescription drugs and cost them only $2.00
for brand-name prescriptions.
In February 1990, Tee Nee Trailer filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11.29 Because Mr. Vespasian was an employee, not a retiree,
he was not covered by 11 U.S.C. § 1114. 11 U.S.C. § 507 gives
priority to up to $2,000 of benefit claims incurred within ninety
days prior to the bankruptcy filing, but Mr. Vespasian's claims far
exceeded $2,000 and in many cases had been incurred more than
ninety days before the company sought bankruptcy protection. The
Union will argue that these expenses should receive priority treat-
ment under 11 U.S.C. § 1113.30
For August Vespasian, it was a third experience of having the
rug pulled out from under his life expectations. The department he
worked in at Republic Steel had shut down. He then worked for
Youngstown Steel Tank, which went bankrupt. Now Tee Nee Trailer
was shut down.31
C. Medical Benefits III: Republic Hose
Liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code can be
more traumatic than reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11.
29. In re Tee Nee Trailer Company, No. 90-217 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) states:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(3) Third, allowed unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or commissions, including va-
cation, severance, and sick leave pay -
(A) earned by an individual within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition
or the date of the cessation of the debtor's business, whichever occurs first; but only
(B) to the extent of $2,000 for each such individual.
Id.
In our experience this language has been understood to include bills for medical services provided
within 90 days of the bankruptcy, if the employee was employed within 90 days of the bankruptcy.
The position that employee medical benefits must continue to be paid by a debtor in possession
unless and until the collective bargaining agreement that mandates the payments is rejected, pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 1113, is supported by In re Unimet Corporation, 842 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1988), and
In re Canton Castings, Inc., 103 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989).
31. Tee Nee Trailer Company closed in August 1990 and any assets will be liquidated.
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Republic Hose Manufacturing Corporation was Youngstown's
first employee-owned company. In the 1970s the Albert Street plant
(then known as Republic Rubber) was operated by Aeroquip, in turn
a subsidiary of the Libby-Owens-Ford conglomerate. The plant made
rubber hoses. In August 1978, the parent conglomerate shut it down.
A joint committee of former managers and hourly employees
asked Aeroquip whether it would sell the plant to them. Aeroquip
said yes, gave the committee an option to buy, and set a price of
$2 million. Six former supervisors invested $100,000 each in the new
company. A local bank loaned $1,350,000, guaranteed by the United
States Department of Commerce. HUD and the Small Business Ad-
ministration provided another $1,250,000 outright. Thus the enter-
prise had $600,000 available for working capital in addition to the
purchase price of the plant.32
Despite this hopeful beginning, the new company lasted only a
few years. There had been two other corporate buy-outs and Re-
public Hose had become a wholly owned subsidiary of a multi-
national corporation with numerous other subsidiaries in the United
States.
On March 2, 1990, Republic Hose filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7.33 A few days earlier, the company put $30,000 into the
fund from which self-insured medical benefits were paid, and told
the administrator of the fund to pay medical benefits for as long
as the money lasted. This, however, was not to be. The trustee in
bankruptcy ordered the administrator not to pay any unpaid medical
benefits, and he secured an order from the court to remove the
money from the medical benefits account so that it could be avail-
able for any debts of the estate according to the Bankruptcy Code
priorities.
One retiree had approximately $8,900 in medical bills on which
payment had been delayed because of errors in the billing. Now all
of these unpaid bills became his responsibility.
32. See S. LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SmUTDowNs: YoUNGSTOWN'S STEEL MILL CLOSINGS 1977-
1980, at 214-15 (1982).
33. In re East Central Corporation AKA: FKA, Republic Hose Corporation, Case No. 490-
00300 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
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Many retirees or their wives had pre-existing conditions such as
cancer, heart problems, diabetes, and high blood pressure. Many
had also been found to have asbestos in their lungs because of their
exposure while working for the company. These conditions either
made them uninsurable or caused new insurance to cost them much
more than their total pensions from Aeroquip, which ranged (among
our clients) from $133 to $303 a month. (They had received only
a lump sum distribution from a defined contribution plan when they
retired from Republic Hose). Some were on Social Security and had
Medicare, but in many cases, their wives were younger and were
not yet eligible for Medicare.
Since this was a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Republic Hose retirees
were not protected by U.S.C. § 1114. COBRA has special provisions
for retirees who lose group health coverage within one year of the
commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. 4 COBRA coverage for
retirees is not cut off by Medicare entitlement3 5 but continues until
the death of the retiree and for three years after the death of the
retiree for the widow, 36 but only so long as the "employer" offers
a group health plan to at least one employee.37 The "employer,"
however, is any member of the group of corporations under common
control.
The rubber workers union was not prepared to undertake any
action on behalf of retirees, but its research department provided
a list of other subsidiaries of the Republic Hose parent. We sought
the assistance of the trustee in bankruptcy to locate one of the sub-
sidiaries that was offering group coverage so that COBRA coverage
could attach to it. After several months, the trustee said nothing
could be done through him or through the bankruptcy court and
he left it to us to pursue the parent corporation.
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1163(6), 1167(3)(C).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(D)(ii).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(A)(iii).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(B).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1167(4); 26 U.S.C. §§ 414(b), (t). All employees of all corporations which are
members of a controlled group of corporations shall be treated as employed by a single employer.
26 U.S.C. § 414(b).
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Counsel for Republic Hose eventually reported that none of the
administrators of plans maintained by the parent or sister corpo-
rations would be willing to add retirees to their group. At this writ-
ing, potential penalties for failure to provide COBRA notice, 39 and
for failure to comply with COBRA,4° may give some leverage to
retirees in seeking to settle their claims in bankruptcy court41 or in
litigation against parties who are not in bankruptcy.
One of the Republic Hose retirees wrote the following letter to
Senator Metzenbaum and Congressman James Traficant of Ohio:
Sir,
I am writing in regards to what took place at Republic Hose manufacturing
of Youngstown, Ohio, division of Goodall Rubber. Both owned by Trel[1]eborg
of Sweden.
I am one of the employees of Republic Hose that was involved in the closing
of that plant. I keep asking questions of different people, in the know, and cannot
get any answers that are satisfactory to myself and other employees that were
involved.
I don't know if you are familiar with the circumstances so if I can let me
try to fill you in. First of all in my case I had 42 years seniority at that location
and they were acknowledged in the contract that was negotiated with that Co.
They (the Co.) chose to close the plant with bankrupt procedures. (Chapter 7 I
understand.) I am told we have no benefits because of the bankrupt procedures.
The Contract we are talking about is not expired until April of 1991, and it states
that I am entitled to Hospitalization for the rest of my life for services rendered.
I gave up increased wages etc. to gain this benefit and am under the impression
that the funds for this would be set aside for this purpose. They did not live up
to their part of the contract. Consequently I have no hospitalization and cannot
even buy any. I should not have to even look for any for me and my wife. This
also lets them and the Insurance companies off the hook. They would be com-
pelled to take care of Hospitalization for us now. They [k]new Insurance Co's
do not have to accept us even if we were willing to and could pay because of
our pre-existing conditions. We were lied to and Stole from. They are nothing
but crooks and should be made to make restitution for what they have done. If
we had violated the contract before the expiration date, would we not be made
39. Under the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA, § 502(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(A)
provides that an administrator who fails to meet the requirements of ERISA § 606(4), 29 U.S.C. §
1166(4) may be liable for up to $200 a day and such other relief as the court deems proper.
40. The Internal Revenue Service can impose a tax of $200 a day where there has been a failure
to satisfy continuation coverage of group health plans and where more than one qualified beneficiary
is affected by the same qualifying event. 26 U.S.C. § 4980B(b)(1) and (c)(3)(B) (1990).
41, Proofs of claim included contingent claims for $2,500 in life insurance, and unliquidated
claims for future medical costs, as well as COBRA penalties.
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to atone for our actions? I think this is enough to go after them or take whatever
action needed to restore these benefits.
Being a representative of the people, for people, is there some way I might
help you in making this right or some way for everybody involved in these kinds
of situations? Please let me know & acknowledge this letter.
Thank you for putting up with my scribbling.
Sincerely!
Frank A. Maizel
D. Medical Benefits IV. GF
There are not many "golden parachutes" in Youngstown, Ohio.
Rank-and-file workers find that their parachutes do not open. Sec-
tion 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, for instance, enacted in 1988 so
that a company could not seek reorganization under the Bankruptcy
Code and at the same time simply stop paying medical benefits,
proved its ineffectiveness in Youngstown in 1990 with the bank-
ruptcy of "GF" (formerly General Fireproofing).
GF makes metal office furniture. Founded in Youngstown early
in the 20th century, GF was perhaps the leading example of a com-
pany locally created, controlled, and managed. At its peak GF em-
ployed several thousand workers.
In the spring of 1976, GF management announced the building
of a new plant across the valley from its existing facility. Local
dignitaries were shown in the YOUNGSTOWN VINDICATOR turn-
ing over a symbolic first spadeful of earth.
Soon after, upon the expiration of their collective bargaining
agreement, GF production and maintenance workers organized in
Local 1617, USWA, went on strike. The strike lasted through the
summer. Within a week after its eventual settlement, the company
cancelled its plans for new construction in Youngstown and an-
nounced that it would transfer one of its major production lines to
a plant in Tennessee.
This was the beginning of the end. An unsuccessful law suit
sought to compel the company to make good on its promise to build
a new plant. An unsuccessful shareholders' campaign tried to retain
local control over the corporation. The 300 remaining workers were
[Vol. 93
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss4/6
BARGAINED-FOR FRINGE BENEFITS
invited to sign a Shutdown Agreement by April 15, 1990, choosing
between a layoff option that included medical benefits, and a sev-
erance option with a lump sum payout. Three days later, on April
18, 1990, GF filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.42
When GF declared itself bankrupt, Delores Hrycyk, first chair-
person of Solidarity USA, called local radio talk shows to tell GF
retirees not to worry. The "Metzenbaum amendment" to the Bank-'
ruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1114, was passed with just this kind of
situation in mind, she assured them. She was wrong. This is what
occurred:
1. Whereas LTV had millions of dollars of annual income at the
time it declared bankruptcy, GF claimed to have run out of money
as of April 18, and to be wholly unable to pay any retiree benefits.
(Both companies were self-insured). Whereas LTV had merely di-
rected its insurance administrators to stop payment on claims at the
time the company declared bankruptcy, GF terminated its insurance
programs. It did so, moreover, without seeking Bankruptcy Court
approval as required by the express terms of Section 1114 .4
2. As a result, more than 1000 hourly and salaried retirees were
abruptly deprived of basic hospitalization insurance, major medical
insurance, and life insurance, and faced with the prospect of paying
an estimated $1.6 million for medical services rendered before the
bankruptcy, and between the bankruptcy filing and June 1.
3. The Bankruptcy Court judge permitted GF in its capacity as
debtor-in-possession to borrow $5 million in direct conflict with the
legislative history of Section 1114.4 The lender made it a condition
42. In re GF Corporation, 115 Bankr. 579 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(1)(A-B) directs a debtor in possession to timely pay and not modify
retiree benefits unless and until an modification is approved by the Court or agreed to by an authorized
representative of retirees.
44. Judge Bodoh relied on In re Jones & Lamson Machine Co., Inc., 102 Bankr. 12 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1989), holding that use of a secured creditor's collateral to pay retiree benefits would raise
constitutional questions and "defeat the public policy of promoting the rehabilitation of financially
distressed companies." Id. at 16. However, the position of the court both in Jones & Lamson and
GF overlooked the fact that during the drafting of 11 U.S.C. § 1114, Congressman Rodino proposed
a substitute for Senator Metzenbaum's bill which directed a Chapter 11 debtor to pay retiree medical
benefits "only to the extent such benefits can be paid without impairing any secured claim in such
case." H.R. 2969, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(a)(2) (1987). This language was dropped from the bill
as enacted and must be assumed not to have been intended by Congress.
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of the loan that the money could be used only to get production
"up and running" in Gallatin, Tennessee and Chicago, Illinois, not
to pay benefits to Youngstown retirees.
4. Judge Bodoh likewise allowed GF's assets to be sold to an
out-of-town purchaser, although the buyer assumed no liability for
the fringe benefits of laid-off employees or retirees, and all proceeds
from the sale were used to pay secured creditors.
5. During the period between GF's declaration of bankruptcy on
April 18 and the sale of its assets on June 11, the company had
current salaried employees covered by group medical insurance and,
as a result, an obligation to give notice of available COBRA cov-
erage to former hourly employees and retirees whose medical in-
surance had been terminated. The company ignored this obligation.
When GF's assets were sold, GF terminated its few remaining sal-
aried employees. As a result there appears to be no existing group
medical insurance plan to which COBRA coverage can attach. For-
mer employees and retirees must try to get individual insurance cov-
erage from companies that do not cover preexisting conditions and
charge hundreds of dollars a month for what coverage they are
willing to provide. Some are uninsurable at any reasonable price.
6. Retirees induced Senator Metzenbaum to file a vigorous ami-
cus statement in which he argued that it would make a "mockery"
of Congress to permit GF to cut off retiree benefits unilaterally. 45
Three days later - and six weeks after GF sought Chapter 11 pro-
45. The Amicus Curiae Statement of United States Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum of Ohio,
filed June 4, 1990, said in part:
The 1986 bankruptcy filing of the LTV Company brought home to all members of
Congress the dire need to give priority treatment to retirees during the pendency of a re-
organization under the Bankruptcy Code .... Congress explicitly amended the Bankruptcy
Code to prevent unilateral termination of benefits from ever occurring again.
... Congress recognized that retirees are uniquely vulnerable when compared to other
creditors under bankruptcy law. Therefore, Congress determined that during the reorgan-
ization process retiree claims should be given priority as administrative claims. Particularly
because retiree health benefits are provided at a considerably lower cost on a group basis,
it is crucial that the group nature of the benefits be preserved ....
Until such time as the bankruptcy court judge, after a hearing, determines that a
company's retiree benefit obligations need to be modified, retiree benefits must continue
to be paid. This requirement is not discretionary .... To hold otherwise, in my view,
would risk making a mockery of Congress' intent to protect retiree benefits.
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tection - the Bankruptcy Court finally ordered GF "promptly" to
pay retiree benefits from any unencumbered funds that it had or
might in the future obtain.4 6
7. GF continued not to pay benefits. When individual retirees
filed a motion seeking to enforce the Court's order, pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 1109(b), the Court found that they had no standing and
threatened their counsel with sanctions under FRCP 11. 47
8. Counsel for the committee of unsecured creditors filed a mo-
tion to convert the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7. Authorized
counsel for the former hourly employees and hourly retirees and for
the salaried retirees thereupon negotiated a so-called compromise
with counsel for the debtor and for the unsecured creditors, pursuant
to which (a) claims for unpaid medical and life insurance benefits
would be cut off as of July 31, 1990, (b) $100,000 would be set
aside for the payment of these claims with the possibility of ad-
ditional payment in the future,48 (c) no provision was made for on-
going group medical insurance or ongoing group life insurance. After
a stormy hearing, 49 the Court vacated its previous order directing
46. In re GF Corp., 115 Bankr. 579 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) provides in its entirety:
(b) A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity
security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee,
may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added). In reliance on this language, fifteen hourly and salaried retirees and a surviving
spouse filed an appearance, and thereafter, a motion for implementation of the Court's order directing
the payment of retiree benefits. The Court dismissed the motion, stating inter alia that the individual
movants "are already represented in these proceedings" by the USWA and by counsel chosen by a
committee of salaried retirees appointed by the Court. The decision added that had the Court "reached
a hearing on the merits of counsel's motion, these issues would have been addressed as possible
violations of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." In re GF Corp., 115 Bankr. at 2-
3.
48. There are individual retirees who owe almost $100,000 in unpaid medical bills. One such
person owes about $84,000 for his wife's terminal illness. She went to the hospital in December 1989,
and died in January 1990, while he was still employed by GF. He retired in March and at the time
GF filed for bankruptcy protection in April the bills had not been paid.
49. The transcript of the September 26, 1990 hearing states in part:
[MR. LYND]: ... And if, as I am afraid I suspect to be the case, the proposal is
to use the bulk of that one hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($150,000.00) for attorney's
fees ....
[COUNSEL FOR GF]: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this rhetoric, because there
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prompt payment of retiree benefits and approved the so-called com-
promise.50
9. Two hundred thirty former employees and retirees are ap-
pealing. 51
BY THE COURT: If you don't shut up, I will clear the courtroom. Now I - the
purpose of this is not to convince you folks. It is to convince me ....
Transcript at 33, in re GF Corporation, 115 Bankr. 579.
50. The crux of the Court's rationale is set forth in the following words:
Conversion to Chapter 7 upon the motion of the Unsecured Creditors' Committee is
not automatic. However, it is clear that the growing amount of super-priority retiree claims,
without the compromise, would constitute grounds to convert. Specifically, these claims
create a "continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable like-
lihood of rehabilitation .... ." U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).
Decision, Oct. 11, 1990, at 7.
51. The issues on appeal are the following:
1. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in vacating its directive of June 7, 1990, that the
Debtor in Possession "shall promptly pay retiree benefits from any unencumbered funds
now in its possession or which it may obtain during the pendency of this Chapter 11 case"
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)?
2. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in approving the allocation to payment of retiree
benefits of only $100,000 of the initial $250,000 in unencumbered funds received by the
Debtor in Possession, and in failing to require the Debtor in Possession promptly to pay
retiree benefits from the unencumbered funds to be received from the sale of the DIP's
Youngstown property approved by the Court on September 26, 1990?
3. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in denying individual retiree creditors standing to
"raise and ... appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter" pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), where individual retiree creditors repeatedly sought to raise issues
through their chosen counsel?
4. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in approving a so-called compromise regarding retiree
and employee benefits that does not provide any opportunity for continued group medical
coverage pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1114 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (COBRA).
5. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in approving a so-called compromise regarding retiree
and employee benefits that does not provide any opportunity for continued life insurance
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1114?
6. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in deciding the merits of a motion to convert this
Chapter 11 case to Chapter 7 without providing an opportunity for objection, without
holding an evidentiary hearing, and without making findings of fact as required by FRCP
52(a)?
7. Did the Bankruptcy Court err in finding that priority payment of retiree benefits
creates a "continuing loss to or diminution of the estate" for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §
1112(b)(1), where priority payment of retiree benefits was the express intent of the Congress
of the United States in enacting 11 U.S.C. § 1114?
8. Where not one penny had been paid in retiree benefits as of the date of the Court's
Order, where the estate could reasonably anticipate more than $2 million in income during
the next nine months sufficient to pay in full the estimated retiree and employee claims
through July 31, 1990, and where the sale agreement with C. P. Ten provided for another
$5 million in income to the estate by 1995, did the Bankruptcy Court err in finding that
there was a "continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable 24
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10. Rule 11 proceedings against one of the authors are pending.
The human meaning of these happenings in Bleak House, USA
may perhaps be suggested by the following, one of many affidavits
filed with the Court in order to attempt to enforce Section 1114.
ARLENE M. GRANLEE, being first duly sworn, states:
I am the surviving spouse of William L. Granlee ... an employee of GF
Furniture Systems, Inc.
For the last two years, since the death of my husband, I have been sending
my monthly contribution to GF for my basic hospital and major medical insurance
coverage.
I do not have enough oxygen in my arteries and it causes me shortness of
breath.
Dr. Alan Cropp has prescribed that I be on oxygen, two (2) liters, twenty
(20) hours per day.
The cost of the oxygen I have been using is $125.00 per month for the tank
and over $91.00 per week for the oxygen.
The Prudential was paying 80% of the cost as a major expense.
... I was advised by Sue Ensley, head of employee benefits at GF Cor-
poration headquarters, that no medical benefits will be paid as of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition on April 18, 1990.
Sue Ensley advised me to get other medical insurance.
I have repeatedly phoned Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ohio. They will not
permit me to convert my coverage to an individual policy . . .2
Or by this one:
HELEN M. DEMARCO, having been duly sworn, states as follows:
... My husband, Frederick R. DeMarco, worked at OF for more than thirty-
two (32) years as an hourly employee. He retired more than five (5) years ago.
As an hourly retiree my husband had hospitalization coverage with Blue Cross
Blue Shield and major medical coverage with Prudential.
In April 1990 I was diagnosed as having cancer of the uterus.
On May 10, 1990, the uterus was surgically removed at St. Elizabeth's Hos-
pital.
... I have no idea how the bill for this surgery will be paid.
Before the surgery, I telephoned Blue Cross Blue Shield in Cleveland about
likelihood of rehabilitation" for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)?
Appellants' Designation of (A) Items to be Included in the Record on Appeal, and (B) Issues to be
Presented, Oct. 29, 1990.
52. Affidavit of Arlene M. Granlee, Apr. 26, 1990, attachment to Motion for an Order Re-
quiring Debtors to Comply with their Obligations under 11 U.S.C. § 1114, filed May 2, 1990.
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medical insurance coverage for the future.
Blue Cross Blue Shield told me:
a. There would be a waiting period of at least six (6) months;
b. The cost for myself only would be $216 a month;
c. Since I am sixty-three (63) years old I am not yet eligible for Medicare;
d. The deductible would be $2500 and the insurance would pay only 80 percent
of the cost beyond that;
e. The insurance would not cover pre-existing conditions, such as any recurrence
of the cancer.
After returning from the hospital, I received a telephone call from an agent
for another insurance company. He wanted to make an appointment for May 16
to discuss hospitalization insurance. When I told him I was not yet up to it because
I just had surgery, he asked what kind of surgery it was. When I told him about
the diagnosis he told me, "Forget it. No insurance company will touch you for
ten years."
Our total income is $176 a month in pension, $318 a month in my Social
Security, and $806 a month in my husband's Social Security, for a total of $1300
a month .... [I]f I could still get Blue Cross Blue Shield coverage for $216 a
month that would be 17 percent of our income.5'
The lessons of experience at LTV, Tee Nee Trailer, Republic
Hose, and GF seem fairly clear . 4 United States corporations do not
create trust funds for payment of promised medical benefits, 5 as
they do in the case of pensions. Instead they undertake to pay med-
ical benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis out of current cash flow. Again,
there are no government guarantees for medical benefits as the PBGC
provides for basic pensions. The consequence of these institutional
arrangements is that when a corporation goes bankrupt, closes a
plant, or is merged into a company that has other plans, the payment
of medical benefits is likely to be curtailed or terminated and society
53. Affidavit of Helen M. DeMarco, May 17, 1990, attachment to Objection of Salaried Retiree
Creditors to Motion to Sell, Transfer, Assume and Assign Property, filed May 17, 1990.
54. Again we wish to emphasize that these particular companies are not unique, even in our
area. Valley-Vulcan Mold, a corporation with plants in Hubbard, Ohio and Latrobe, Pennsylvania,
filed for bankruptcy protection in fall 1990. In the preceding weeks, some employees received successive
notices representing, first, that the company would pay medical benefits through September 30, 1990;
second, that the company would pay medical benefits through Labor Day, 1990; and finally, that
medical coverage was cancelled as of August 1, 1990.
55. A remedy now being advocated is that companies be required to put into a trust fund, or
at least to show as liabilities in their financial statements, the estimated amount necessary to fulfill
promises of retiree benefits at the time the employers are earning those future benefits. Freudenheim,
New Rule on Benefits Approved, The New York Times, Oct. 18, 1990, at Cl. But international
competition is leading not just to the closure of particular plants. Entire industries are going out of
business in the United States. It makes no sense to tie medical and pension benefits to the profitability
of one corporation or even one industry.
[Vol. 93
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has no fallback plan in place to prevent irreparable harm. These
problems are too big for collective bargaining to resolve.
III. PENSION BENEFITS
A. Pension Benefits I: LTV
Collectively-bargained pensions are inadequate because the typ-
ical private pension plan does not provide for cost-of-living ad-
justments. 56 Therefore, it is, in reality, a decreasing income stream,
not a "fixed income." Moreover, absent supplemental arrangements
in particular industries, the need for pensions is assumed to begin
at age 65 (or 62) because it is assumed that any able-bodied, red-
blooded resident of the United States under the age of 65 who really
wants a job, can find one.
Congress sought to deal with some pension problems when it
passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in
1974. Title IV of ERISA created the PBGC to protect the basic
pensions of plan participants when a pension plan is terminated.
Reflecting the implicit assumption of both private and public social
policy that jobs are available for those not yet at retirement age,
ERISA does not insure the supplemental benefits that have been
obtained through collective bargaining. Such supplements are a sig-
nificant source of income for early retirees, including approximately
8,000 early retirees from LTV. The supplements are paid to workers
when the department or plant in which they are working is shut
down. Typically, the supplement is $400 a month from retirement
until age 62, at which time the retiree qualifies for reduced Social
Security retirement benefits.57
56. Only one in four private pension plans provides annual increases to offset inflation. Partly
for this reason, only 7 percent of people receiving private pensions receive at least half their income
from this source. Uchitelle, Company-Financed Pensions Are Failing to Fulfill Promise, The New
York Times, May 29, 1990, at Al.
57. When plants are shut down and workers in their fifties are retired, they are also deprived
of ten to fifteen years of earnings at higher levels than they can hope to earn on other jobs. Their
basic pensions are small without those additional years at the upper end of the wage scale. Their
wage base for calculating Social Security benefits is also lower. Many early retirees have to take
reduced Social Security benefits when they go off the pension supplement at age 62; thus, their Social
Security benefits will be less for life than if they had worked until normal retirement age.
1991]
27
Lynd and Lynd: Labor in the Era of Multinationalism: The Crisis in Bargained-For
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
LTV illustrates the inadequacy of existing pension arrangements.
As of February 1990 there were 13,800 active LTV workers and
46,000 - almost three times as many - hourly retirees.58 The ratio
explains why LTV declared bankruptcy and why, notwithstanding
ERISA and the guarantee program of the PBGC, there is a pension
crisis as well as a crisis in medical benefits. Current workers cannot
generate the income necessary to pay the benefits of a much larger
number of retirees. 59 Also, if more companies thus situated terminate
their pension plans, the PBGC itself would go bankrupt, or so it
fears.
The pension dimension of the LTV bankruptcy that was (for the
moment) resolved by the Supreme Court in PBGC v. LTV Corp.
arose, first, from LTV's failure to fund its pension plans sufficiently
to pay even the basic deferred pensions that fall due at normal
retirement age, and second, from LTV's initial refusal to continue
to pay pension supplements to early retirees after its pension plans
were terminated. As Justice Blackmun explained:
[When LTV filed for reorganization in July 1986 it was the sponsor of several
defined benefit pension plans.] Chronically underfunded, the Plans, by late 1986,
had unfunded liabilities for promised benefits of almost $2.3 billion. Approxi-
mately $2.1 billion of this amount was covered by PBGC insurance.
It is undisputed that one of LTV Corp's principal goals in filing the Chapter
11 petitions was the restructuring of LTV Steel's pension obligations, a goal which
could be accomplished if the plans were terminated and responsibility for the
unfunded liabilities was placed on the PBGC. LTV Steel then could negotiate
with its employees for new pension arrangements. LTV, however, could not vol-
untarily terminate the Plans because two of them had been negotiated in collective
bargaining. LTV therefore sought to have the PBGC terminate the Plans ....
With LTV's consent, the Plans were terminated effective January 13, 1987.
Because the Plans' participants lost some benefits as a result of the termi-
nation, the Steelworkers filed an adversary action against LTV in the Bankruptcy
Court, challenging the termination and seeking an order directing LTV to make
up the lost benefits. This action was settled, with LTV and the Steelworkers
negotiating an interim collective-bargaining agreement that included new pension
58. These were the estimates of counsel for the USWA in proceedings before the Bankruptcy
Court in In re Chateaugay Corporation, 112 Bankr. 526 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1990).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(II) provides that termination of a pension plan shall be per-
mitted when "the costs of providing pension coverage have become unreasonably burdensome ...
solely as a result of a decline of such person's workforce .... "
[Vol. 93
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arrangements intended to make up benefits that plan participants lost as a result
of the termination .... 60
The "lost benefits" referred to by Justice Blackmun are the $400
a month supplementary payments to about 8,000 early retirees, de-
scribed above. The negotiations to which the opinion refers, resulted
-in payments of approximately 90 percent of the supplement, or $360
a month, from which FICA and state income taxes were, for the
first time, deducted. The FICA tax alone amounted to $27.04 a
month. In reality, the typical early retiree received $360, less at least
$27.04 or $332.96, a month. This was 83 percent of what had been
received before. The Supreme Court characterized this outcome as
placing retirees in "substantially the same positions they would have
occupied had the old Plans never been terminated." 61 Retirees living
on meager pensions and pension supplements did not view the loss
of more than $800 a year (12 times $67.04) as insubstantial.
PBGC opposed the negotiated "follow-on" plan, and also con-
cluded that LTV had fared much better financially than PBGC had
forecast. For both these reasons PBGC determined to restore the
terminated pension plans to LTV, pursuant to a power conveyed by
Section 4047 of ERISA,62 but never before used. LTV refused to
comply, and the resulting dispute brought the issue to the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court held that PBGC's decision to restore the
terminated plans to LTV was not arbitrary and capricious, was not
contrary to Congressional intent, and was based on a permissible
interpretation of the statute. In particular, as earlier emphasized,
the Court accepted PBGC's rationale that a policy prohibiting ne-
gotiated follow-on plans would cause employees to "object more
strenuously to a company's original decision to terminate a plan"
and to offer significant "employee resistance" to a pension plan's
termination. The lower courts were instructed to institute "further
proceedings consistent with this opinion," to see to it that PBGC's
decision to restore the terminated plans to LTV was carried out.
60. 110 S. Ct. 2668, 2672-73.
61. Id. at 2673.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1347.
1991]
29
Lynd and Lynd: Labor in the Era of Multinationalism: The Crisis in Bargained-For
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The Court's decision is an apparent victory for retirees, at least
in the short run. 63 If and when the Supreme Court's decision is
implemented, 64 LTV retirees will, for the first time since July 1986,
be entitled to 100 percent of the medical and pension benefits they
were promised when they retired. Since this has been the goal of
Solidarity USA since its formation, the organization and its members
applauded the outcome of the Supreme Court case.
In the long run, however, the picture is much less clear. The
decision in PBGC v. LTV Corp. masks rather than resolves the
following contradictions:
1. ERISA sanctions pension plan termination when the PBGC
determines that a plan "will be unable to pay benefits [to partici-
pants] when due" or that "the possible long-run loss [to the PBGC]
with respect to the plan may reasonably be expected to increase
unreasonably if the plan is not terminated. ' 65
What happens when the objective of paying benefits to parti-
cipants conflicts with the objective of not increasing PBGC's loss?
This dilemma presented itself in regard to LTV when, late in 1986,
PBGC anticipated that LTV would shut down several plants the next
year. In the words of the Supreme Court:66
63. But if LTV applies for distress termination in the future, and the application is approved,
early retirees will lose their supplements completely and there will not be any "follow-on" plan to
replace benefits lost by plan termination.
64. As of late October 1990, more than four months after the Supreme Court's decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had remanded the case to the District Court, and the District
Court had not yet ordered restoration of the plans. Early retirees still receive only a percentage of
their supplements and FICA tax is still deducted. LTV is arguing that there has been a change of
circumstances (lack of funds in one of the pension plans) such that the Supreme Court decision should
not be enforced. Furthermore, in a complaint against the Department of Labor, LTV is seeking a
declaratory judgment that would require LTV not to make any contributions to the underfunded
pension plans except as part of a reorganization plan. LTV Corporation v. Department of Labor,
Adversary No. 90-Civ-6305A, Civil Action No. 90-Civ-6048.
65. U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) and (a)(4). This ambiguity in PBGC's rationale for pension plan ter-
mination echoes the ambiguity in PBGC's overall purposes as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a):
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for
the benefit of their participants,
(2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to participants
and beneficiaries under plans to which this title applies, and
(3) to maintain premiums established by the corporation under section 4006 at the lowest
level consistent with carrying out its obligations under this title.
66. 110 S. Ct. 2668, 2672-73.
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These shutdowns, if they occurred before the plans were terminated, would have
required the payment of significint "shutdown benefits." The PBGC estimated
that such benefits could increase the Plans' liabilities by as much as $300 million
to $700 million, of which up to $500 million was covered by PBGC insurance.
Thus, if the plans were not terminated, retirees would predictably
receive shutdown benefits that they would not receive if PBGC moved
promptly to terminate the plans. Faced with the choice between an
option that would maximize payouts to plan beneficiaries and an
option that would most protect its own funds, the agency "deter-
mined that the Plans should be terminated in order to protect the
insurance program from the unreasonable risk of large losses, and
commenced termination proceedings ...."67
2. The Court tells employees to object strenuously and to resist
when corporations threaten to terminate pension plans. But what
exactly are employees and retirees supposed to do if, for example,
LTV once again does not fund or seeks to terminate its plans?68
The first termination, in January 1987, was effectuated by secret
proceedings in the District Court without notice to employees, re-
tirees, or the United Steelworkers of America. There is no reason
to suppose that PBGC would provide any more ample notice next
time since ERISA apparently does not require it for involuntary
terminations.
Or if notice is provided, what are the means of struggle with
which workers and former workers can intervene? The problem may
be compared to the analogous plant closing process. In Youngstown,
it was traumatic when workers at Youngstown Sheet & Tube's
Campbell Works, received only a week's notice of the mill's shut-
down in September 1977. However, workers at Jones & Laughlin's
Brier Hill Works were only marginally better off when, in December
1978, they learned that their workplace would be closed in about
a year. Of course, with more time to prepare, individual workers
were better able to cope with loss of income and benefits, and to
rebuild their lives. But for the workers as a whole, and for the
67. Id.
68. If the plans are restored to LTV and LTV does not put funds into the plans, it will only
be a matter of time before the plans will be unable to pay benefits when due, triggering another
involuntary termination by PBGC.
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community of the Mahoning Valley, there was little more that one
could do to protest with only a year's notice than had been possible
at the Campbell Works in a week.69 With or without notice, how
can employees and retirees of a company in bankruptcy force the
company to fund its plans?70
So long as the law gives the authority to close plants or terminate
pension plans to corporations, as an aspect of their managerial pre-
rogative and as a kind of decision at the "core of entrepreneurial
control,''71 it is a cruel joke solemnly to advise workers to object
strenuously and to resist.
B. Pension Benefits II Wean United
The Wean United struggle shows how hard it is for workers and
retirees effectively to wage the strenuous objection and resistance
with which, according to PBGC v. LTV Corp., they should respond
to the threatened termination of their pension benefits. Wean United
was a company based in Youngstown that for many years made
machinery for steel mills. The Wean United hourly pension plan
became seriously under-funded. Wean United sought and found a
buyer for some of its subsidiaries who paid no cash but assumed
liability for the under-funded pension plan. United Engineering, Inc.
became the new plan sponsor.
The new owner purchased these subsidiaries with the fully-formed
intention of terminating the pension plan as soon as possible. This
threatened over 200 early retirees with loss of their $400 a month
pension supplements. Instead of receiving a monthly check in the
neighborhood of $800 ($400 basic pension plus $400 pension sup-
plement) these retirees faced a fifty percent loss of pension income
in the event of plan termination.
In the LTV situation, it seemed that the retirees were always
playing catch-up. This time they would act before the pension plant
69. See LYND, THE Fxnrr AGAiNST SHUTDowNs, supra, Part II.
70. LTV retirees have already submitted requests pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5) and (b)(1)(B)
asking the Secretary of Labor to exercise her authority to enforce minimum funding requirements.
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was terminated. As soon as United Engineering applied to the PBGC
for permission to terminate its pension plan, a petition was circulated
asking the Union to file suit on the ground that the termination
would be in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. 2 It
was suggested that the filing of such a suit would stay termination
proceedings. The Union filed suit on behalf of the class of retirees
threatened with loss of the supplement. 73
The company and the Union informally agreed that pension sup-
plements would continue to be paid. PBGC, however, advised the
company that it was contrary to law for it to continue to pay the
supplement after the proposed termination date.74 The retirees sought
to prevent the termination of the plan so as to protect the pension
supplement, only to find that, under another provision of ERISA,
the company, merely by applying for distress termination, had to
stop paying the pension supplement to retirees.
We tried to keep the pension plan from being terminated for as
long as possible because retroactive payments of the supplement
would be required for any months between the actual cut-off of
supplement payments and the actual termination date of the pension
plan.
But as the money in the pension plan was running out, it became
apparent that the plan would have to be terminated soon, either
voluntarily by settlement of the law suit or involuntarily by the
PBGC. A settlement was negotiated solely on the issue as to the
date of termination of the pension plan, leaving unresolved con-
tractual claims for payment of the supplement from company funds
other than the pension fund, and without addressing the company's
demand for a scaling back of medical insurance benefits. We argued
for the latest possible termination date and were able to obtain ret-
roactive payment of the supplement for nine of the fourteen months
72. U.S.C. § 1341(c) prohibits termination of a pension plan if the termination would violate
a collective bargaining agreement.
73. Humble v. United Engineering, Inc., Case No. C 88-4236Y (N.D. Ohio 1988).
74. Federal law provides that after applying for a pension plan termination, the pension plan
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that had elapsed since payments were cut off. Members of the class
who were eligible received $3,600 with interest.
The loss of future monthly supplement payments for some of
the younger retirees amounted to as much as $50,000. There is little
chance that any of them will see any part of this money.7"
It is hard to imagine what more the Wean United retirees could
have done by way of strenuous objection and resistance. They dem-
onstrated at the plant, with support from Solidarity USA. They
stopped a loan from the State of Ohio to the company pending
resolution of the pension supplement dispute. They tried, unsuc-
cessfully, to have a lien placed on property sold by the company
until retiree benefit obligations had been satisfied. They made trip
after trip to the offices of Union lawyers in Cleveland, at one point
threatening to leave settlement negotiations if the Union refused to
let one of the authors attend and participate. Their efforts were
dogged by the fact that the Union, which represents the remaining
active workers at United Engineering, fears that the payment of
retiree benefits might lead to further plant closings. The power of
the company, the legal fortifications of that power, and the Union's
fear of plant closings, make strenuous objection and resistance very
difficult.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current suggestions for reviving the labor movement, such as
running a person of integrity for president of the Teamsters Union,
or building coalitions between community organizations and existing
unions, miss the point. In this era of ever more intense international
economic competition, the nature of the labor movement must
change.
We suggest that working people need to rethink from the ground
up what kinds of institutions can best serve their needs. In this article
we have sought to. document one facet of labor impotence: to show
75. Retirees who were in payment status at least three years before the effective date of plan
termination may receive a small percentage of their non-guaranteed benefits through a "recovery
ratio" as yet undetermined. 29 U.S.C. § 1322, 1344(a).
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that in industries most impacted by overseas competition, collective
bargaining for fringe benefits has broken down or is breaking down,
and that unions in these industries are unable to enforce the pension
and medical insurance promises made by employers at the bargaining
table.
But this particular malaise exemplifies a more general problem.
A focused examination of concessions in medical and pension ben-
efits is particularly apt because these epitomize the larger crisis that
permeates all aspects of collective bargaining. These benefits have
been among the first casualties of the current concessional bar-
gaining trend, providing a glimpse of what is to come in negotiations
over other subjects of bargaining. If we can understand the crisis
in medical and pension benefits, we will have an understanding of
the process taking place at all levels of labor-management relations.
It may be suggested in response to this thesis that the plight of
retirees is not fairly comparable to that of active union members.
Collective bargaining may not be working for retirees, according to
this rebuttal, but this does not mean that collective bargaining is
not working for any one. Indeed, from this point of view, the break-
down in retiree representation may reflect nothing more than one
unfortunate Supreme Court decision in the Pittsburgh Plate Glass
case.
76
We disagree. It is a point well taken that in Pittsburgh Plate
Glass, the same Supreme Court that has now called on retirees stren-
uously to object and to resist when their benefits are threatened,
held that these benefits were not a mandatory subject of bargaining
and, thereby, weakened the ability of retirees to hold union ne-
gotiators accountable." But emphasis on particular decisions of the
courts blurs the fundamental fact that union members have little
more power to control their union representatives than do retirees.
76. Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
77. The Court states that when a union bargains for retirees, the retirees could sue for breach
of contract under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act if benefits were unilaterally
changed. 404 U.S. at 181, n.20. But of course this means that retirees, rather than directly controlling
union representatives through voting for union officers and in contract ratification votes, would have
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Just as what is happening to retiree benefits foreshadows what is
in store for union-negotiated benefits of all kinds, it also prefigures
the powerlessness and marginalization that union members will ex-
perience as the fruits of generations of struggle are thrown away in
coming concessionary negotiations. This is why we believe that a
qualitatively new approach is needed. Such an approach would have
two components.
For some functions hitherto sought to be performed by private
collective bargaining, like the provision of fringe benefits, the na-
tional government will need to step in as in other industrialized
societies, using tax revenues, including payroll deductions, to guar-
antee health care and retirement income for all. If it is objected
that the American public will resist higher taxes, the answer is that
health care administrative costs are far less in Canada than in the
United States. 78 The legislative patchwork represented by 11 U.S.C.
§ 1114, COBRA, and ERISA, needs to be recognized as inadequate,
and more fundamental, publicly-funded solutions must be brought
forward.7 9
78. See Himmelstein & Woolhandler, Cost Without Benefit: Administrative Waste in U.S. Health
Care, 314 NEw ENo. J. oF MED. 441 (1986); Woolhandler & Himmelstein, Resolving the Cost/Access
Conflict: The Case for a National Health Program, 4 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED., 54 (1989); Evans,
Controlling Health Expenditures - The Canadian Reality, 320 NEw ENo. J. OF MED. 571 (1989);
Evans, Health care in Canada: patterns of funding and regulation, in G. McLACHLAN & A. MAYNARD,
The Public/Private Mix for Health, 371; Himmelstein & Woolhandler, Socialized Medicine: A Solution
to the Cost Crisis in Health Care in the United States, 16 ITrr'L J. oF HM.TH SER icEs, 339 (1986).
79. The union movement itself appears to agree that national health insurance is required to
replace, or at least supplement, collectively-bargained medical insurance. According to a recent report
by the Service Employees International Union, health benefits were a prime cause of major labor
strikes, involving nearly 78 percent of striking workers in 1989 (versus only 18 percent in 1986).
Matthiessen, Bordering on Collapse, MODERN MATurIY (publication of the American Association of
Retired Persons) (Oct.-Nov. 1990), 30-32. The Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers union has endorsed
the Canadian-style plan put forward by Physicians for a National Health Program. OCAW, Health
Care: Information and Speaker's Manual at 1. Laura McClure, Healthcare - what are we fighting
for?, New York Labor Punch Out, at 3 (Aug. 1990). The United Steelworkers of American endorses
a more vaguely-defined National Health Care Program, and have negotiated collective bargaining
agreements obligating four major steel companies to help seek an appropriate national health policy.
Steel Companies To Join Drive For National Health Care Policy, Oldtimer, Autumn 1989, at 6; Why
National Health Care, id., Summer 1990, at 8. In 1990 various unions sponsored a week-long national
mobilization for health care in April and Health Care Action Day on Oct. 3. Unions insist businesses
play big health care role, The Youngstown Vindicator, July 25, 1990, at 11; Oil, Chemical & Atomic
Workers Union Mobilizes for NHP Week April 21-28, PNHP Newsletter (Mar. 1989); UE Locals
Demand 'National Health Care Now!' 52 UE News 6 (1990); Union Members Seek Health Care
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BARGAINED-FOR FRINGE BENEFITS
Other subjects of collective bargaining should be returned to the
grass roots. The single cause most responsible for the ineffectual
state of the labor movement in the United States is the lack of
participation by rank-and-file workers in decisions that affect their
lives. Union members are told by officials who want to control all
decisions to leave it to these leaders to take care of things. Union
members are conditioned to expect the union to deliver a wage/
benefit package in return for dues which are automatically deducted
from their paychecks. In union and non-union shops alike, there is
little opportunity for shop floor initiative. Concerted activity that
might be protected by law in the absence of a contractual waiver
is barred by the no-strike clause which was voluntarily accepted by
CIO unions since their inception.
Retirees, however, are not bound by contractual no-strike agree-
ments and have employed an imaginative mixture of direct action,
lobbying, and litigation, that has not been possible for current em-
ployees in this country. Here again, other industrialized nations point
the way, as in the recent flurry of nationwide strike actions coor-
dinated from below in Poland, in the Soviet Union, and elsewhere.
The world economy requires concerted action that can be started in
one place, but is also free to spread nationally and internationally,
across union and industry boundaries.80
Reforms, 135 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 211-13, (1990) (BNA). On the other hand, Jerry Tucker of the
New Directions movement in the UAW, points out:
The UAW has supported a national health care system for a long time. When I was
working in Washington in the 70s, we had a little apparatus set up, a one or two person
staff, called the Committee for National Health Insurance. Like organizing of course, we
didn't put very many resources into it, not the kind that the issue deserves ....
The entire labor movement is guilty of paying issues like this more lip service than
anything else. You have to take these to the streets sometimes.
New Directions for the UAW: An Interview with Jerry Tucker, II Multinational Monitor 33 (1990).
80. Space is lacking in this article to set forth fully the basis in history, law, and personal
experience for the assessment of the labor movement presented. See A. LYND & S. LYND, RANK AND
FILE: PERSONAL HsTolms By WoRKINo-CLAsS OROANIuRS (3d ed. 1988); A. LYND & S. LYND, WE
ARE THE UNION: THE STORY OF ED MANN (1989); LYND, Youngstown: Rebuilding the Labor Movement
from Below, in MIKE DAvis, FIRE IN THE HEARTH: THE RADICAL POLITICS OF PLACE IN AMEmCA 177
(1990); Lynd, From Protest to Democracy: Labor-Community Ownership and Management of the
Economy, in J. BREc ER & T. CosTLo, BUIDING BRIDGES: Tan EmERoING GRASSROOTS COALION
OF LABOR AND ComuNTrrY 259 (1990); Lynd, The Possibility of Radicalism in the Early 1930s: The
Case of Steel, in J. GREEN, WORKERS' STRUoLES, PAST AN) PREsENT 190 (1983); Lynd, Where is
Teamster Rebellion Going?, in id. 312; Lynd, Thesis and Antithesis: Section 7 of the NLRA, the
1991]
37
Lynd and Lynd: Labor in the Era of Multinationalism: The Crisis in Bargained-For
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Perhaps consideration of such ideas could be indefinitely post-
poned, were it not for the pressure that has been exerted and will
predictably be more forcefully exerted in the future, by competition
from outside the United States. The labor movement does not have
the luxury of continuing with business as usual, even if it could
somehow induce its disillusioned membership to do so. The labor
movement must be rebuilt from below, with the goal of a more
equal sharing of the fruits of labor in the spirit of "an injury to
one is an injury to all." In the process, workers may develop a
facility for strenuous objection and resistance that will astonish the
Supreme Court that recently called for such activity.
First Amendment, and Workers' Rights, in J. LoBEL, A LEss TiAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE
PERSPECTVEs ON THE U.S. CONSTIITmON 151 (1988); Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity
after Union Recognition, 50 IND. L. J. 720 (1975); Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro
Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. REs. 396 (1979); Lynd, Ideology and Labor Law, review of Atleson, Values
and Assumptions in American Labor Law, 36 STAN. L. REv., (1984); Lynd, Solidarity Unionism:
Rebuilding the Labor Movement from Below (forthcoming 1991) (available from the author).
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